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Abstract We consider two no-show paradoxes, in which a voter obtains a preferable
outcome by abstaining from a vote. One arises when the casting of a ballot that ranks a
candidate in first place causes that candidate to lose the election, superseded by a lower-
ranked candidate. The other arises when a ballot that ranks a candidate in last place
causes that candidate to win, superseding a higher-ranked candidate. We show that
when there are at least four candidates and when voters may express indifference, every
voting rule satisfying Condorcet’s principle must generate both of these paradoxes.
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1 Introduction
Condorcet’s principle, proposed in the eighteenth century by the Marquis of Condorcet,
is one of the most important normative principles in the theory of voting. A Condorcet
winner is a candidate for election who is preferred by a majority in all pairwise com-
parisons with the other candidates. Condorcet’s principle says that a Condorcet winner
must be elected whenever there is one (Condorcet, Marquis de 1785).1
However, Moulin (1988) shows that Condorcet’s principle entails a surprising and
troubling paradox for voting rules, called the no-show paradox. This paradox arises
when the addition of a ballot that ranks candidate x above candidate y may take victory
away from x and give it to y.
1 A voting rule consistent with this principle was proposed as early as the thirteenth century (see
Colomer 2013).
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A voting rule that is free from this paradox, so that no voter is made worse off
for having voted sincerely rather than abstaining, is said to satisfy the participation
principle.2 Moulin proves that a voting rule cannot satisfy both Condorcet’s principle
and the participation principle when there are four or more candidates.
If we are to satisfy Condorcet’s principle then we must tolerate the no-show paradox.
However, we may consider some instances of the paradox to be more severe than others.
In that case, we may have reason to prefer some “Condorcet-consistent” voting rules
over others, since some of them might at least be free from these severe cases of the
paradox.
In this paper we consider two special cases of the no-show paradox. These would
seem to be especially bizarre instances. One arises when the casting of a ballot that
ranks a candidate in first place causes that candidate to lose the election, superseded
by a lower-ranked candidate. The other arises when a ballot that ranks a candidate in
last place causes that candidate to win, superseding a higher-ranked candidate. We call
these the strong no-show paradoxes after Pérez (2001) and Nurmi (2002). One or both
of these special cases of the paradox are also considered by Smith (1973), Richelson
(1978), Brams and Fishburn (1983), Saari (1995), and Lepelley and Merlin (2001).3
Pérez (2001) demonstrates that Condorcet-consistent voting rules do exist that are
free from one or even both of the strong no-show paradoxes, no matter the number
of candidates. One of these is the Simpson–Kramer Min–Max rule. That rule is free
from both of the strong no-show paradoxes. Young’s rule is free from one of the two
paradoxes; a ballot that ranks a candidate in last place can never cause that candidate
to win under Young’s rule. See Pérez (2001) for definitions of both of these rules and
several other Condorcet-consistent rules.
1.1 Weak orderings
Moulin (1988) considers the aggregation of linear orderings or, in other words, the case
where voters do not express indifference. An inspection of Moulin’s proof is sufficient
to confirm that his impossibility result continues to hold true for the aggregation
of weak orderings. It is unsurprising that expanding the domain of voting rules by
permitting voter indifference does not lead to a possibility result. Typically, in social
choice theory, the emergence of possibility is associated with the contraction of a
domain rather than the expansion of one (see Gaertner 2001).4
Pérez (2001) considers the aggregation of linear orderings and the aggregation of
weak orderings. It is only in the case of linear orderings that he finds compatibility
between Condorcet’s principle and freedom from the strong no-show paradoxes. He
2 Logical relations between the participation principle and other monotonicity conditions are examined by
Campbell and Kelly (2002), Nurmi (2004), Sanver and Zwicker (2009, 2012), and Felsenthal and Tideman
(2013).
3 Brams and Fishburn note that paradoxes of this kind were remarked upon by the Royal Commission
Appointed to Enquire into Electoral Systems (1910, p. 21) and Meredith (1913, p. 93).
4 Nevertheless, Barberà (2007) shows that the introduction of indifferences can sometimes complicate the
statement of both positive and negative results in social choice theory.
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Table 1 A cyclical profile with
15 voters 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
a b c bc ac ab a b c
b c a a b c bc ac ab
c a b
shows that this compatibility vanishes when we move from linear to weak orderings.
In fact, even when there are just three candidates there is an impossibility. Recall that
Moulin’s impossibility result applies just when there are four or more candidates.
Voting rules that are free from the strong no-show paradoxes satisfy conditions
called Positive Involvement and Negative Involvement. In the case of weak orderings,
Positive Involvement says that if candidate a is a winning candidate and we add a
voter who ranks a in first place then a must remain a winning candidate. Negative
Involvement says that if candidate a is a losing candidate and we add a voter who
ranks a in last place then a must remain a losing candidate.
To help motivate what comes next, we reproduce here Pérez’s proof of this impos-
sibility in the case of weak orderings. Suppose that there are three candidates a, b,
and c, and 15 voters. The voters’ preferences are described in Table 1. Each number
above the horizontal line indicates the number of voters with the preference ordering
given below that number. Letters are written next to each other to indicate indiffer-
ence. This profile of preferences is “cyclical” in the sense that each candidate pair-
wise defeats one of the others by a margin of one vote: a beats b, b beats c, and
c beats a. Suppose, without loss of generality, that a is the unique winning candi-
date or is tied for victory with one or both of the other candidates. In the case of
a tie, all of the tied candidates are said to be winning candidates. A tie-breaking
mechanism such as a lottery may be used to elect one from among the winning
candidates.
Suppose that we add two new voters who are indifferent between a and c, and
prefer both of those to b. Let us write that ordering as a ∼ c  b. Then c becomes
the Condorcet winner. So a is no longer a winning candidate, despite a being ranked
in first place by the new voters.
Now suppose that instead of adding those two voters we exclude the two voters
with preference ordering b  a ∼ c. Then, again, c becomes the Condorcet winner.
So when we readmit these two voters a becomes a winning candidate despite both
voters ranking a in last place. This completes the proof of the impossibility.
In that first case, candidate a may well object to being removed from the set of
winners as a result of the addition of two new voters who rank a in first place. However,
from the perspective of the new voters, or of a welfarist social planner, it is not clear that
there is really a problem. The new voters are indifferent between a and c and so they
are no worse off. Indeed, if the original result was a tie between all three candidates
and if a lottery was to be used to break that tie, then the new voters are better off for
having voted. They have ensured victory for one of their most preferred candidates,
ruling out the chance that b might be elected by lottery. Forbidding a scenario in which
the new voters are better off for having voted is arguably not in keeping with the spirit
of the participation principle.
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Let us return to the second scenario where we removed two voters with preference
ordering b  a ∼ c. When those two voters abstain c is the unique winner. When they
cast their ballots the set of winning candidates contains a. These two voters then are no
worse off for having voted. Indeed, they may well be better off. Suppose, again, that the
result at the 15-voter profile is a three-way tie with a lottery to be used for tie-breaking.
Then these two voters benefit from voting. They have given b a chance of being elected
by lottery. An impartial observer may see no reason to object to this change in the out-
come, and these voters do not appear to have a strategic incentive to abstain in this case.
1.2 Contribution
For simplicity, let us now restrict our attention to deterministic voting rules that always
choose a single winner. Perhaps ties are broken by lexicographic order rather than by
lottery, for example. Under this restriction, the Positive Involvement condition can be
decomposed into two parts. Suppose that a is the original winner and we add a new
voter who ranks a in first place. Part (i) says that a must not be superseded by another
candidate also ranked in first place by the new voter. Part (ii) says that a must not be
superseded by a candidate ranked below a by the new voter.
In the proof given above, part (ii) of the Positive Involvement condition is entirely
redundant. Perhaps by deleting part (i) and retaining only part (ii), which we might
call the welfarist part, we can regain the compatibility with Condorcet’s principle that
was lost in the move from linear orderings to weak orderings.
Similarly, Negative Involvement can be decomposed into two parts. Suppose that
a is not the original winner and we add a new voter who ranks a in last place. Part
(i) says that a must not take victory from another candidate also ranked in last place
by the new voter. Part (ii) says that a must not take victory from a candidate ranked
above a by the new voter. Again, only part (i) is invoked in the proof argument above.
When part (i) of each of these conditions is deleted we call the resulting conditions
Weak Positive Involvement and Weak Negative Involvement. We find that Condorcet’s
principle is compatible with both of these conditions when there are three candidates,
and that it is compatible with neither of them when there are at least four candidates.
The case of linear orderings that Moulin considers is standard in the theory of
voting. However, in economic theory more generally it is usual to model preferences
by weak orderings. Notably, individual indifference is permitted both in the case
of Arrow’s theorem (Arrow 1963) and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard
1973; Satterthwaite 1975).
Both of those theorems have sometimes been presented in the literature in their
linear-ordering forms. This is done for the sake of simplicity as the differences between
the two forms of either theorem are considered to be minor. Yet, it turns out that mov-
ing to the weak-ordering setting has an important consequence for Moulin’s theorem.
When individuals can be indifferent, the requirement that a voter must never be made
worse off by voting sincerely than by abstaining is significantly more demanding than
is necessary. This requirement can be weakened to either Weak Positive Involvement or





Let A be a finite set of candidates, and let N∞ be a finite or countably infinite set of
potential voters. Every finite subset of N∞ is called an electorate. Let W (A) be the
set of all weak orderings on A. By a weak ordering we mean a binary relation on A
that is transitive and complete.
A profile assigns a weak ordering to each voter in an electorate. For every electorate
N there is a set of possible profiles W (A)N . We write u−i to denote the profile obtained
by removing individual i from profile u.
A voting rule is a function S that assigns a candidate to every possible pair of
electorate and profile. So, given an electorate N and a profile u in W (A)N , S(N , u) is
the winning candidate.5
When discussing a given electorate and profile, we write nab for the number of
voters who prefer a to b less the number of voters who prefer b to a. Let ma be the
greatest value taken by nba over all b in A\{a}. If ma > 0 then ma is the margin of
a’s greatest pairwise defeat. Candidate a is a Condorcet winner if and only if ma < 0.
If ma is zero then a does not suffer any pairwise defeat but does tie with another
candidate in a pairwise comparison.
3 Results
We first define Condorcet consistency.
Condorcet consistency For all candidates a, all electorates N and all profiles u in
W (A)N , ma < 0 implies S(N , u) = a.
Next we define Weak Positive Involvement and Weak Negative Involvement.
Weak Positive Involvement For all electorates N containing at least two voters, all voters
i in N and all profiles u in W (A)N , if S(N\{i}, u−i ) is in the highest indifference
class of i’s preference ordering then so is S(N , u).
The Weak Positive Involvement criterion requires that if a candidate ranked in first
place by individual i is elected when i does not participate, then a candidate ranked
in first place by i should also be elected when i does participate.
Weak Negative Involvement For all electorates N containing at least two voters, all
voters i in N and all profiles u in W (A)N , if S(N\{i}, u−i ) is not in the lowest
indifference class of i’s preference ordering then nor is S(N , u).
The Weak Negative Involvement criterion requires that if a new voter i casts her
ballot, bringing us from profile u−i to profile u, and if the original winning candidate
was not one of i’s least favorite candidates, then her ballot should not cause one of her
5 A voting rule as defined here always takes a single candidate as its value. Ties are not permitted in the
outcome. This is also the case in Moulin (1988). Moulin’s theorem is extended to the case in which ties
are permitted in the outcome by Jimeno et al. (2009). Their results are similar to some results found in
the corresponding literature on extensions of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (see Taylor 2005 for an
overview of that literature).
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least favorite candidates to win. If a candidate ranked in last place by i was already the
winner at the original profile, then the Weak Negative Involvement criterion is silent.
Our first result establishes that, when there are three candidates, deleting part (i)
from each of Positive Involvement and Negative Involvement, as discussed above,
does achieve compatibility with Condorcet consistency.
Theorem 1 If there are three candidates or fewer then Condorcet consistency is com-
patible with both Weak Positive Involvement and Weak Negative Involvement.
Proof Following Moulin (1988), we give the example of a voting rule that always
elects a candidate from the Kramer set (see Kramer 1977).
Given (N , u), let K , the Kramer set, be the set of all candidates a that minimize
ma . That is, K = {a ∈ A | ma ≤ mb for all b ∈ A}. If K is a singleton set then voting
rule S elects that candidate in K . If K contains more than one candidate then S elects
the candidate in K whose name comes first by lexicographic order.
If there is a Condorcet winner a then it follows that ma < 0 and mb > 0 for all other
candidates b. Then K = {a} and a will be elected by S. So S is Condorcet-consistent.
This is true no matter how many candidates there are.
We now establish that S satisfies Weak Positive Involvement and Weak Negative
Involvement when there are three candidates. Let us label the candidates a, b, and c.
These labels mask the names of the candidates so that their lexicographic ordering by
name is unknown to us. Take any electorate and profile. These will be the electorate
N\{i} and profile u−i referred to in the definitions of Weak Positive Involvement and
Weak Negative Involvement. Assume without loss of generality that S elects a at this
profile. It follows that ma ≤ mb and ma ≤ mc. Let us now form the electorate N and
profile u by adding a new voter.
We consider three cases. The first case is that the new voter strictly prefers a to
both of the other candidates. The second case is that the new voter strictly prefers a
to exactly one of the other candidates. Just for completeness, the final case is that the
new voter does not strictly prefer a to either of the other candidates.
In the first case, Weak Positive Involvement requires that a remain the winner. On
the other hand, Weak Negative Involvement does not necessarily require that a must
remain the winner. It makes that demand only if b and c are in joint last place in
the new voter’s preference. Otherwise, it makes the milder demand that the candidate
ranked last by the new voter does not become the winner. We have not specified who
is ranked last by the new voter, but it is not necessary to do so since, as we will see,
the winner will remain a.
In this first case ma falls by one. Since we are adding just one new voter, all margins
of pairwise defeat/victory can change by at most one. So mb and mc cannot fall by
more than one. In other words, ma remains equal to or falls below (or further below)
each of mb and mc as a result of the additional voter. Therefore, the new Kramer set is
a subset of the original Kramer set, and must contain a. Hence, S elects a at the new
profile, as required.
For the second case, let us assume without loss of generality that b is the candidate
who is weakly preferred to a by the new voter. It may be that a and b are both ranked
first, or that b alone is. If a and b are both ranked first then Weak Positive Involvement
requires that either a or b is the winner at the new profile. If b alone is ranked first
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by the new voter then Weak Positive Involvement makes no requirement at all. On
the other hand, regardless of who is ranked first by the new voter, Weak Negative
Involvement requires that c must not become the winner since c is ranked in last place.
So Weak Negative Involvement is either equivalent to or stronger than Weak Positive
Involvement for this case. If the winner at the new profile is not c then both conditions
are satisfied.
In this second case mc increases by one, and ma cannot increase by more than
one. In other words, mc remains equal to or rises above (or further above) ma . So c
can only be in the new Kramer set if that set also contains a and the original Kramer
set contained c (implying that candidate a’s name comes before c’s by lexicographic
order). Hence, S does not elect c at the new profile, as required.
In the final case both Weak Positive Involvement and Weak Negative Involvement
permit any outcome at the new profile. A violation of either condition entails the new
voter being made worse off as a result of having voted. In this final case, the new voter
ranks a below or equal to each of the other candidates and, since a was already the
winner at the original profile, this means that the new voter is not made worse off by
any change in the outcome.
When there are just two candidates then it is clear that simple majority rule with
lexicographic tie-breaking will satisfy Weak Positive Involvement and Weak Negative
Involvement. unionsq
Our second result states that when the number of candidates rises above three
then no Condorcet-consistent rule can satisfy Weak Positive Involvement. We use 37
potential voters in the proof.
Theorem 2 If there are at least four candidates and at least 37 potential voters then
Condorcet consistency is incompatible with Weak Positive Involvement.
Proof This proof is based on the proof of statement (ii) in Moulin (1988). Let us
assume that A contains at least four candidates and that S is Condorcet-consistent
and satisfies Weak Positive Involvement. By way of contradiction, assume that N∞
contains at least 37 potential voters. We make the following claim. For all distinct
candidates a and b, every electorate N and every profile u in W (A)N ,
ma + 1 ≤ 37 − |N | and ma + 2 ≤ nab implies S(N , u) 	= b. (1)
To prove (1), take any electorate N , a profile u in W (A)N , and candidates a and b
such that ma + 1 ≤ 37 − |N | and ma + 2 ≤ nab and assume that S(N , u) = b. Since
S is Condorcet-consistent, a cannot be a Condorcet winner. Therefore, ma ≥ 0. Let
M and w be an electorate and profile obtained by adding ma + 1 voters to (N , u), all
of whom rank b alone in first place and a alone in second place.
At (N , u) the greatest margin of defeat suffered by a is ma , and a defeats b by
a margin of at least ma + 2. So the addition of ma + 1 voters who all rank b alone
in first place and a alone in second place results in all of a’s pairwise defeats being
reversed, while a continues to pairwise defeat b. So candidate a is a Condorcet winner
at (M, w). However, since b is elected at (N , u), Weak Positive Involvement requires
that b is elected at (M, w). This contradiction establishes (1).
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To complete the proof we construct two profiles. Take any four candidates a, b, c,
and d. The first of the two profiles, let us call it profile u1, is described in Table 2. Each
number above the horizontal line indicates the number of voters who have submitted
the ranking below that number. All other candidates (if there are any) are ranked below
a, b, c, and d by the voters.
Figure 1 is a directed, weighted graph that indicates the margins of pairwise victory
and defeat among the top four candidates. An edge is directed from b to a and carries
a weight of six to indicate that b pairwise defeats a by a margin of six, and so on.
There are 24 participating voters, and we have ma = 6 and nad = 8 so, by (1),
S cannot elect d. We have md = 8 and mdb = 10 so S cannot elect b. For every
candidate x in A\{a, b, c, d} we have ma = 6 and nax = 24 so S cannot elect x .
Hence the winner must be a or c.
Now let us add eight voters to that first profile to create profile u2. All eight of these
new voters are indifferent between a and c, and rank those two candidates in joint first
place. Their next most preferred candidate is b, followed by d, and they rank all other
candidates (if there are any) below d.
Now the graph is as shown in Fig. 2.
Table 2 The preferences for
profile u1 6 3 8 7
a a d b
d d b c
c b c a
b c a d
Fig. 1 The pairwise majority
comparisons for profile u1
Fig. 2 The pairwise majority
comparisons for profile u2
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There are 32 participating voters, and we find that mc = 4 and nca = 6, so,
again by (1), S cannot elect a. We also have mb = 2 and nbc = 4, so S cannot
elect c. However, Weak Positive Involvement implies that S must elect a or c. This
contradiction completes the proof. unionsq
Next we consider the compatibility of Condorcet’s principle and Weak Negative
Involvement. This is not symmetric to the case of Weak Positive Involvement. Recall,
for instance, that under Young’s rule with linear orderings, as mentioned in the intro-
duction, a voter may cause her favorite candidate to lose but will never cause her least
favorite to win. For the case of weak orderings, however, we find that Weak Negative
Involvement contradicts Condorcet’s principle when there are at least four candidates
and at least 34 potential voters.
Theorem 3 If there are at least four candidates and at least 34 potential voters then
Condorcet consistency is incompatible with Weak Negative Involvement.
Proof Let us assume that there are at least four candidates and at least 34 potential
voters and that S is Condorcet-consistent and satisfies Weak Negative Involvement.
Take any four candidates a, b, c, and d. A profile is described in Table 3. Let us call
this profile w1. In this table we use Greek letters to label the six weak orderings that
appear in the profile. We say that there are four α voters, five β voters, and so on. The
x in each column marks the position of all candidates x in A\{a, b, c, d} (if there are
any), and it is written next to another letter to indicate indifference. For example, the
four α voters are indifferent among the candidates in A\{a, b, c}, and rank all of those
candidates in last place.
Figure 3 indicates the margins of pairwise victory and defeat among the top four
candidates.
Table 3 The preferences for
profile w1 α β γ δ  ζ4 5 1 6 4 6
b a d a d b
c c a d b d
a d b b c c
dx bx cx cx ax ax
Fig. 3 The pairwise majority
comparisons for profile w1
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Fig. 4 The pairwise majority
comparisons for profile w2
There are 26 participating voters. If three of the four α voters are deleted from profile
w1 then a’s pairwise defeats to b and c are reversed and a becomes a Condorcet winner.
So, by Weak Negative Involvement, a candidate in {a, b, c} must be elected at profile
w1. If instead we delete the five β voters then d becomes a Condorcet winner. So b
(ranked in last by those voters) cannot be elected at profile u. The winner must be a
or c.
Now let us add eight voters to create a final profile w2. All eight of these new voters
rank c alone in first place, a alone in second place, and rank all other candidates in
joint last place.
Now the graph is as shown in Fig. 4 (there is a pairwise tie between c and d).
There are 34 participating voters. If we delete the four  voters and five of the six
ζ voters then c becomes a Condorcet winner. So a cannot be elected at profile w2. If
instead we delete the single γ voter and the six δ voters then b becomes a Condorcet
winner. So c cannot be elected at profile w2. However, Weak Negative Involvement
implies that S must elect a or c. This contradiction completes the proof. unionsq
As a final remark, we note that the numbers of potential voters in Theorems 2 and 3
may not be minimal. We do not know what upper bound is imposed on the number
of potential voters by the conjunction of Condorcet consistency and Weak Positive
Involvement (or Weak Negative Involvement) when there are four candidates. Indeed,
the same goes for the conjunction of Condorcet consistency and the participation
principle in the case of linear orderings. And these upper bounds may fall as the
number of candidates rises. These are important open problems since voting is often
conducted by small groups of individuals.
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